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NOTE
Strengthening the Internal Affairs Doctrine
Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904 (Del. Ch. 2020).
Andrew J. Meyer*

I. INTRODUCTION
The state of Delaware plays a significant role in shaping corporate
law around the country. Delaware is home to a substantial number of
corporations – more than half of publicly held corporations and over sixty
percent of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in the state.1
Furthermore, it contains the most out-of-state incorporations – a situation
where a business incorporates in Delaware but has a principal place of
business in another state.2 For instance, the State of Missouri has ten
Fortune 500 corporations with their principal place of business in the state,
two of which are incorporated in Delaware.3 Delaware maintains that the
large number of incorporations is due to the predictability and stability
provided by the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), the
corporate law-focused Delaware Court of Chancery (“Chancery Court”),
and the prompt and efficient service provided to corporations through the

*

B.S. Computer Engineering, B.S. Electrical Engineering, Missouri University of
Science & Technology, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law,
2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021. I would like to thank
Professor Thom Lambert for his insight, guidance, and support during the writing of
this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1
Facts and Myths, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/facts-andmyths/ [https://perma.cc/94VP-4EFS] (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
2
Id.
3
Fortune
500,
FORTUNE,
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2021/search?hqstate=MO [https://perma.cc/5BSMAXS2]
(last
visited
Aug.
10,
2021);
Cerner
Corp,
SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=804753&owner=exclude
[https://perma.cc/UT9C-9VMG] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (located in North Kansas
City, MO and incorporated in Delaware); Centene Corp, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=1071739&owner=exclude
[https://perma.cc/3YME-F22B] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (located in St. Louis, MO
and incorporated in Delaware).
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state’s tailored legal system.4 Regardless of the accuracy of these claims,
commentators and experts generally agree on Delaware’s importance in
corporate law.5
Because of this, a recent case decided in the Chancery Court could
have an impact on corporate law throughout the country. In Juul Labs,
Inc. v Grove, the Chancery Court considered whether a shareholder could
invoke a California shareholder inspection law to demand inspection of
the books and records of a Delaware corporation incorporated in Delaware
that had its principal place of business in California.6 The court held that
the Internal Affairs Doctrine dictated that only Delaware law governs a
shareholder’s inspection rights of a Delaware corporation and the doctrine
precluded the shareholder from demanding inspection under California
law.7 The Internal Affairs Doctrine is a court-made principle that states
that disputes among the corporation, its directors, officers, and
shareholders over the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the
laws of the state of incorporation.8
This Note examines the history of the Internal Affairs Doctrine and
analyzes the reasoning of the Chancery Court. Part II outlines the facts
and holding of Grove, Part III details the background of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine, Part IV describes the Chancery Court’s decision in
Grove. Finally, Part V critiques the court’s decision and discusses its
implications. It does so by discussing the various interests of the states
and questioning whether Delaware’s interests in regulating its
corporations overrides the compelling interests of other states in regulating
foreign corporations which principally reside within their borders. It
concludes by discussing possible future disputes over laws regulating
diversity on boards of directors and if the Internal Affairs Doctrine will
apply.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The plaintiff in Juul Labs, Inc v. Grove, Juul Labs, is a Delaware
corporation whose principal place of business is in San Francisco,
California.9 Juul Labs is the result of a 2017 spin-off from Pax Labs, Inc.,
4
Why
Businesses
Choose
Delaware,
DELAWARE.GOV,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/
[https://perma.cc/U4M5-ZXYR] (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
5
Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's
Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59–60 (2009).
6
238 A.3d 904, 907 (Del. Ch. 2020).
7
Id.
8
The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative
Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480 (2002) [hereinafter
The Internal Affairs Doctrine].
9
238 A.3d at 907.
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a company that creates vaporizer products using cannabis and a variety of
other plant-based materials.10 In 2015, Pax Labs released the e-cigarette
known as JUUL, which serves as an alternative to traditional cigarettes
and delivers nicotine to users through a vapor.11 Pax Labs spun off Juul
Labs, Inc. and the JUUL products to allow Juul to focus on cigarette
alternatives while Pax Labs could focus on other plant-based materials.12
The defendant, Daniel Grove, is a former employee of Juul Labs.13
While employed at the company, Grove obtained options to acquire
20,000 shares of common stock in the company as part of his
compensation.14 To accept the options, Grove electronically signed a
standard-form acceptance agreement on August 4, 2017.15 On February
1, 2018, Grove exercised his options to purchase 5,000 shares of common
stock by electronically signing a standard-form exercise agreement.16
Both standard-form agreements contained similar provisions that
stipulated Grove waived his inspection rights as a shareholder under
Section 220 of the DGCL.17 Furthermore, the company’s certificate of
incorporation contained a forum-selection provision designating Delaware
courts as the exclusive forum for disputes governed by the Internal Affairs
Doctrine.18 Through the purchase of this stock, Grove became a minority
shareholder in Juul Labs.19

10

Ari Levy, E-cigarette maker Juul is raising $150 million after spinning out
of vaping company, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2017, 6:30 PM EST),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/19/juul-labs-raising-150-million-in-debt-afterspinning-out-of-pax.html [https://perma.cc/GE7Z-EWE9]; About, PAX LABS, INC.,
https://www.pax.com/pages/about [https://perma.cc/MT3V-DBK9] (last visited Feb.
13, 2021).
11
PAX Labs, Inc. Introduces Revolutionary Technologies with Powerful ECigarette JUUL, BUSINESS WIRE (April 21, 2015 8:00 AM EDT),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150421005219/en/PAX-Labs-Inc.Introduces-Revolutionary-Technologies-with-Powerful-E-Cigarette-JUUL
[https://perma.cc/RZV3-4R2G]; What is a JUUL?, JUUL (July 2, 2019),
https://www.juul.com/about-juul [https://perma.cc/WNL6-S22F].
12
Levy, supra note 10.
13
Grove, 238 A.3d at 907.
14
Id.
15
Id. The acceptance stipulated that (1) the company’s 2007 Stock Plan would
govern the options, (2) the options were granted under the terms of a standard-form
stock option agreement, and (3) the options could only be exercised under a standardform stock option exercise agreement. Id. at 907–08.
16
Id. at 908.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 918.
19
See Shareholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint at 19, Grove v.
Bowen, No. CGC-20-582059 (Super. Ct. of Cal. County of S.F. filed Jan. 7, 2020).
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In recent years, Juul Labs has come under scrutiny from the public
and the United States Government over20 a large increase in use of ecigarettes by children and the emergence of lung injuries attributable
them.21
In 2017 and 2018, the United States Food and Drug
Administration reported a seventy-eight percent increase in students
vaping, with approximately 3.6 million children using e-cigarettes.22
According to the United States Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, there have been 2,807 reported hospitalizations or deaths
linked to lung injuries caused by e-cigarettes and vaping products, with
sixty-eight confirmed deaths.23
In response to these and other issues, Grove demanded to inspect the
records and books of Juul Labs under the authority of Section 1601 of the
California Corporate Code.24 Section 1601 allows shareholders residing
in California to demand inspection of the accounting books, records, and
meeting minutes of any domestic corporation of California or any foreign
corporation that maintains records or a principal executive office in
California.25 Grove indicated that if Juul Labs refused or failed to respond
to his demand, he might seek a court order to compel production.26
Instead of complying with Grove’s inspection demand, Juul Labs
filed an action in the Chancery Court on January 6, 2020, for declaratory
and injunctive relief against Grove.27 Juul sought a declaration from the
20

JUUL suspends flavoured e-cigarette sales to curb teen use, BBC NEWS (Nov.
18,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46201263
[https://perma.cc/KPU2-DHCR].
21
Michigan becomes first state to ban flavoured e-cigarettes, BBC NEWS (Sept.
4,
2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49585672
[https://perma.cc/YM7T-9526]; Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of
E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products, CDC (Feb. 25, 2020 1:00 PM EST),
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lungdisease.html [https://perma.cc/TU4S-5Z2Y].
22
Michigan becomes first state to ban flavoured e-cigarettes, supra note 21.
23
Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping,
Products, supra note 21.
24
Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 2020).
25
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1601(a)(1) (West) (“The accounting books, records, and
minutes of proceedings of the shareholders and the board and committees of the board
of any domestic corporation, and of any foreign corporation keeping any records in
this state or having its principal executive office in this state, or a true and accurate
copy thereof if the original has been lost, destroyed, or is not normally physically
located within this state shall be open to inspection at the corporation's principal office
in this state, or if none, at the physical location for the corporation's registered agent
for service of process in this state, upon the written demand on the corporation of any
shareholder or holder of a voting trust certificate at any reasonable time during usual
business hours, for a purpose reasonably related to the holder's interests as a
shareholder or as the holder of a voting trust certificate.”).
26
Grove, 238 A.3d at 908.
27
Id.
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court that the corporation was not obligated to make its books and records
available to Grove.28 It also moved to enjoin Grove from using California
law to circumvent the waiver included in his stock-purchase agreements.29
On February 10, 2020, Juul Labs and Grove each moved for a
judgment on the pleadings in the Chancery Court.30 On August 13, 2020,
the court granted Juul Labs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding
that, under the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the right of a shareholder to seek
inspection of the books and records of a Delaware corporation exists only
under Delaware law.31 It further held that, in Grove’s case, any action to
enforce that right must be brought in a Delaware court because the forumselection clause in the company’s charter stipulated that Delaware courts
had jurisdiction over any action governed by the Internal Affairs
Doctrine.32

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In the United States, corporate law is primarily the province of the
states.33 Provisions of state corporation laws range from “trivial
housekeeping to the fundamental fashioning of shareholder-manager
relations.”34 They can specify something as small as requiring that a
corporation’s name be placed in its charter to something as significant as
specifying the fiduciary duties of directors and the voting rights of
shareholders.35 Corporate laws can vary considerably from one state to
another.36 To account for these variations among corporate laws, states
28

Id.
Id.
30
See generally Opening Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904 (Del. Ch. 2020) (No. 20200005-JTL), 2020 WL 758687; see also Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support
of His Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904
(Del. Ch. 2020) (No. 2020-0005-JTL), 2020 WL 758640.
31
Grove, 238 A.3d at 920.
32
Id. at 918–19. The Chancery Court explained in a footnote that, but for the
forum-selection provision in the company’s charter, “nothing would prevent a
California court from hearing Grove’s claim to inspect books and records under
Delaware law.” Id. at 919, n.13. Another issue addressed by the Chancery Court was
whether the standard-form agreements signed by Grove waived his inspection rights
under California law, i.e., Section 1601. Id. at 907. The court answered in the negative
because either (1) the agreements only contemplated waiver of his rights under
Delaware law, i.e., Section 220 or (2) the agreements were exclusive for a defined set
of stockholders of which Grove was not a member of. Id. The court did not decide
whether a stockholder can waive his inspection rights under Delaware law. Id. at 919.
33
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
The Internal Affairs Doctrine, supra note 8.
29
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largely apply the Internal Affairs Doctrine to ensure consistency and
predictability in governing corporations that operate in multiple states.37
The Internal Affairs Doctrine is a court-made conflict-of-law policy
which requires that disputes among the corporation, its directors, officers,
and shareholders over the internal affairs of a corporation be governed by
the laws of the state of incorporation.38 While the policy is easy to recite,
interpreting and applying it can be more difficult. Specifically, whether an
affair should be categorized as internal or external may be open to
debate.39
Subpart A presents the historical context under which the Internal
Affairs Doctrine emerged. Subpart B then outlines the doctrine’s modern
justifications and rationales. Finally, Subparts C and D briefly discuss the
application of the doctrine in the state of Missouri and the emergence of
state outreach statutes that challenge the doctrine.

A. The History of the Internal Affairs Doctrine
The history of the Internal Affairs Doctrine and how it came to be is
unclear.40 This is partly due to the fact that adherence to the doctrine
requires states to voluntarily give up their power to regulate foreign
corporations using their own laws and instead apply the laws of the
incorporating state.41 If Missouri, or any other state, wishes to regulate a
particular business activity or market, it is generally within its power to do
so as a sovereign jurisdiction within the United States.42 However, most
states adhere willingly to the doctrine, and some have chosen to codify it.43
Prior to industrialization, choosing to incorporate in one state while
operating in others was typically not an option.44 Businesses generally
operated locally at low volumes of production and exchange due to the
technological limitations of the time and were primarily partnerships
consisting of family members.45 States granted charters to businesses
through special acts of the legislature rather than through the simple

37

Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine,
32 J. CORP. L. 33, 36 (2006).
38
The Internal Affairs Doctrine, supra note 8.
39
Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder Deriv. Actions L. & Prac. § 2:13 (2020–
2021).
40
Tung, supra note 37, at 35.
41
Id. at 36–37.
42
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (recognizing that the Constitution
preserves the sovereign status of the States).
43
The Internal Affairs Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1480–81.
44
Tung, supra note 37, at 44.
45
Id. at 55. In 1830, the United States only had twenty-three miles of railroad
track, and sources of energy were limited to humans, animals, wind, and water. Id.
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modern day administrative process. 46 Businesses that operated in multiple
states obtained a charter from each state.47 States held a territorial
monopoly over regulating businesses within their borders due to the
localized nature of commerce in the pre-industrial era, and an exertion of
power over foreign corporations would likely have been seen as an
intrusion upon the other state’s sovereignty.48
Spurred in part by improvements to transportation, communication,
and energy production, industrialization brought both business growth and
an increase in interstate commerce.49 As interstate commerce and
industrialization increased, states began to move away from special
charters and adopt general corporate laws.50
In the late 1800s, New Jersey emerged as a pioneer in corporate law
by breaking with the traditional territorial approach.51 It sought to entice
businesses to incorporate within it by helping out-of-state businesses file
certificates of incorporation, provide an address for their principal offices,
and provide an employee to serve as the business’s local agent for service
of process. 52 Corporations flocked to New Jersey and, rather than resist,
most states modified their corporate laws to match New Jersey’s.53
Although it was within their power, states did not attempt to exclude or
regulate New Jersey corporations, nor did the states prevent domestic
corporations from being acquired.54 Instead, states copied New Jersey
corporate laws to “defend against the tide of their domestic corporations
seeking new charters from New Jersey.”55 While New Jersey may have
been first, Delaware ultimately won the battle for the most out-of-state
incorporations.56
As interstate commerce increased, disputes over the internal affairs
of corporations arose in courts outside the states of incorporation, and the
Internal Affairs Doctrine emerged.57 Typically, these disputes involved
46

Id. at 52, 55–56.
Id.at 55–56. Early corporations were not exclusively profit-seeking, but were
quasi-public agencies with a mixture of public and private funding. David McBride,
General Corporation Laws: History and Economics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3
(Winter 2011).
48
Tung, supra note 37, at 56.
49
Id. at 56–58.
50
Id. at 60, 63.
51
Id. at 74.
52
Id. at 78–79. Early on, large trusts were the primary entities to reincorporate
in New Jersey to avoid being attacked by attorneys general in their home states. Id. at
80.
53
Id. at 80, 83.
54
Id. at 82–83.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 37, 42.
57
Id. at 57.
47
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resident shareholders exerting their rights against foreign corporations in
which they had invested.58 The early decisions involving the internal
affairs of corporations “echoed pre-industrial notions of states' sovereignty
over their domestic corporations.”59 Courts generally found their
jurisdictional limitations over foreign corporations to be self-evident and
gave deference to the laws of the incorporating state.60 They consistently
noted that corporations owed their existence to their state of incorporation
and, as such, only incorporating states possessed the power to regulate
their corporations’ internal affairs.61 The New York legislature rejected
the doctrine for a time.62 Most states, however, did not, and the courts
continued to think of corporations in territorial terms and as creations of
their state of incorporation.63 This deference and lack of resistance gave
rise to an understanding among the states not to interfere with the internal
affairs of one another’s domestic corporations.64

B. The Justifications and Rationales for the Doctrine in its Modern
Form
Over the years, scholars and courts have offered several rationales for
the doctrine’s existence and persistence.65 Asserted rationales have rested
on both non-constitutional and constitutional grounds.66
There are three main non-constitutional rationales put forth for the
Internal Affairs Doctrine – the contractual justification, the consistency
justification, and the state-interest justification.67 The contractual
justification views the Internal Affairs Doctrine as a choice of law
principle that respects a corporation’s decision to incorporate in a
particular state by applying the laws of that state. 68 It posits that persons
that were parties to the agreement to incorporate contractually chose the
laws of the incorporating state by electing to form there, and the doctrine
therefore dictates that the laws of the incorporating state govern for
internal affairs.69
58

Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 66.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 92–93.
63
Id. at 92, 96.
64
Id. at 68.
65
The Internal Affairs Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1482.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1483.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1483–84. Under this theory, future shareholders are deemed to be
parties to the original incorporation agreement constructively. Id. at 1483 n.27.
Additionally, other persons, such as third parties suing in tort, are deemed to not be
59
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The consistency justification holds that it is efficient to apply the laws
of the incorporating state because it reduces uncertainty over which laws
apply to disputes regarding the corporation’s internal affairs.70 Reducing
uncertainty can theoretically reduce costs because the corporation will
only have to comply with the corporate laws of its incorporating state and
not the laws of each state it operates in.71 Furthermore, proper compliance
can reduce the costs associated with litigation.72
Finally, the state-interest justification holds that the incorporating
state has a greater interest than other states in regulating the internal affairs
of the corporation.73 This rationale rests significantly upon the history of
corporations and where their power is derived from.74 Specifically, the
law formerly considered the corporation to be a creature of the state and
only recognized it in the incorporating state.75 As a result, only the laws
of the incorporating state could govern the corporation.76
In addition, courts and scholars have put forth constitutional
explanations for the Internal Affairs Doctrine. The Delaware courts are the
most ardent proponents of these explanations, one of which is the
Commerce Clause.77
The Commerce Clause is a power enumerated to the United States
Congress to regulate interstate commerce; however, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted it to also bar states from passing laws that
discriminate against interstate commerce – the Dormant Commerce
Clause.78 On its face, eliminating the Internal Affairs Doctrine within a
state would not be discriminatory because it would treat all corporations
within a state uniformly regardless of whether they are domestic or
foreign. 79 However, by subjecting corporations to inconsistent obligations
from state to state, it could still discourage interstate commerce and
thereby violate the Commerce Clause.80 The United States Supreme Court

parties to the original agreement and the law of the forum state governs because it is
an external affair. Id.
70
Id. at 1485–86.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1488.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Vincent S.J. Buccola, States' Rights Against Corporate Rights, 2016 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 595, 639 (2016). The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Causes are
two other theories that will not be discussed in this Note.
78
Id. at 641. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the
power…[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes….”).
79
Buccola, supra note 77, at 641–42.
80
Id.
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has never directly addressed the constitutional implications of the doctrine,
but it indirectly addressed them in two 1980s cases involving the Dormant
Commerce Clause.81
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., decided in 1982, the Court struck down an
Illinois statute that required a tender offer to be registered with the Illinois
Secretary of State if the target corporation maintained a certain level of
contact with the State.82 Illinois argued that the statute served a local
interest by protecting resident shareholders and that the statute also
regulated the internal affairs of companies incorporated in Illinois. 83 The
Court recognized the Internal Affairs Doctrine as a conflict of law
principle.84 It then dismissed Illinois’s internal affairs argument by stating
that tender offers contemplate a transfer of shares to a third party, which
does not implicate the internal affairs of the target company.85
Furthermore, the Court noted that the statute also applied to foreign
corporations whose principal place of business is outside of Illinois and
that Illinois had no interest in regulating foreign corporations.86
Ultimately, the Court decided the case on other grounds and held that the
statute violated the Commerce Clause in that the statute imposed a
substantial burden on interstate commerce that outweighed the local
benefits.87
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, decided in 1987, the
United States Supreme Court considered another tender offer statute in
Indiana, which regulated the allocation of voting rights in Indiana
corporations.88 This time, the Court upheld the statute, finding that the
effect it had on interstate commerce was justified by Indiana’s interest in
regulating shares in its domestic corporations and protecting
shareholders.89 The Court acknowledged the Internal Affairs Doctrine and
stated that “[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly

81

The Internal Affairs Doctrine: supra note 8, at 1490; see also Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69
(1987).
82
457 U.S. at 626–27, 630.
83
Id. at 644.
84
Id. at 645 (“The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's
internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a
corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.”).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 645–46 (“The [Illinois statute] applies to corporations that are not
incorporated in Illinois and have their principal place of business in other States.
Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.”).
87
Id. at 643.
88
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 73–74 (1987).
89
Id. at 94.
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established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations,
including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.”90 It
continued, stating that “[a] State has an interest in promoting stable
relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well
as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice
in corporate affairs.”91 Furthermore, the Court cited cases in which it
invalidated statutes that “may adversely affect interstate commerce by
subjecting activities to inconsistent regulation.”92 The Court stated that
the existence of the current market system, which facilitates ownership of
corporations by shareholders in multiple states, depends upon the fact that
a corporation is organized under and governed by the law of a single
jurisdiction. 93 It noted that this jurisdiction is traditionally the state of
incorporation except in the rarest of situations.94
While these two cases do not directly confront whether there are
constitutional underpinnings of the Internal Affairs Doctrine,
commentators have suggested that they hint at such a possibility. 95 Edgar
came close in that the Court stated in dicta that Illinois had no interest in
regulating a foreign corporation.96 CTS Corp. articulated that the current
state of affairs in interstate commerce depends upon corporations being
governed by a single jurisdiction; however, it did not decide whether
regulation of interstate commerce mandated it.97
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the constitutional implications of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the
Supreme Court of Delaware did in 1987, shortly after the decision in CTS
Corp.98 In McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, the Supreme Court of Delaware
decided that the corporate law of the country of Panama would govern the
internal affairs of a Panamanian corporation that owned a Delaware

90

Id. at 89.
Id. at 91.
92
Id. at 88–89.
93
Id. at 90 (“Large corporations that are listed on national exchanges, or even
regional exchanges, will have shareholders in many States and shares that are traded
frequently. The markets that facilitate this national and international participation in
ownership of corporations are essential for providing capital not only for new
enterprises but also for established companies that need to expand their businesses.
This beneficial free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a
corporation—except in the rarest situations—is organized under, and governed by, the
law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its
incorporation.”).
94
Id.
95
The Internal Affairs Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1494; Buccola, supra note 77,
at 642.
96
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645–46 (1982).
97
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987).
98
See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
91
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subsidiary.99 In making this decision, the court held that the Internal
Affairs Doctrine is not only a conflict of law principle, but it is “also one
of serious constitutional proportions—under due process, the commerce
clause and the full faith and credit clause….”100 The Delaware Supreme
Court quoted Edgar, specifically the United States Supreme Court’s
statement that Illinois had no interest in regulating a foreign corporation.101
It also quoted CTS Corp., where the United States Supreme Court spoke
of corporations traditionally being governed by the laws of the
incorporating state except in the rarest of situations.102 Although the
Delaware Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court had not yet made an official decision on whether the
doctrine is grounded in the Constitution, it nevertheless held that the
doctrine is mandated by constitutional principles.103 The Delaware
Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in subsequent cases.104 Regardless
of the arguable constitutional underpinnings, most states, including
Missouri, choose to adhere to the Internal Affairs Doctrine.105

C. The Internal Affairs Doctrine in the State of Missouri
The Internal Affairs Doctrine is codified in Missouri law, which
states that its corporate code “does not authorize [Missouri] to regulate the
organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to
transact business in [Missouri].”106 Missouri courts have interpreted this
provision only once in the past thirty years.107
In Yates v. Bridge Trading Co., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District considered whether the Internal Affairs Doctrine
precluded the choice of Missouri law by parties to a stock purchase
agreement in a pseudo-foreign corporation.108 The corporation at issue
was incorporated in Delaware, but maintained its principal place of
business in Missouri, and had most of its shareholders in Missouri.109 The
99

Id. at 209.
Id. at 216.
101
Id. at 217.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 217–18.
104
See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108,
1115 (Del. 2005); see also Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 135–36 (Del.
2020).
105
1 James D. Cox & Thomas L. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations
§ 2:13 (3d ed. 2020); 26 Philip G. Louis, Jr., Mo. Prac. Business Organizations § 29.14
(2d ed. 2021).
106
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.582(3) (2016).
107
Yates v. Bridge Trading Co., 844 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
108
Id. at 62.
109
Id.
100
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court determined that the Internal Affairs Doctrine did not apply because
the corporation was a pseudo-foreign corporation where the only contact
it had with Delaware was the fact that it was incorporated there.110 The
court reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, as an issue of first
impression in Missouri, it relied upon other jurisdictions that already
addressed the question.111 Specifically, the court cited precedent from
California, New York, and Ohio that reached the same conclusion
regarding pseudo-foreign corporations.112 It noted that this precedent
demonstrated an increasing willingness by courts and legislatures to
deviate from the traditional rigidity of the doctrine and regulate foreign
corporations that maintain certain levels of contacts with a forum state.113
Secondly, the court determined that the risk of inconsistent obligations to
the shareholders was low in this case.114 Yates demonstrates that Missouri
is willing to depart from a strict interpretation of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine in particular situations. Other states, however, take a more active
approach in challenging the doctrine.

D. State Outreach Statutes and Challenges to the Internal Affairs
Doctrine
Though most states adhere to the Internal Affairs Doctrine, some
choose to challenge it. New York and California enacted corporate
outreach statutes that “impose their own…internal governance
requirements upon foreign corporations having a specified level of contact
with [them].”115 California’s outreach statute, Section 2115, provides that
California’s corporate code will apply to certain foreign corporations for
specified internal governance matters.116 The statute incorporates, by
reference, other laws that cover issues such as election and removal of
directors, a director’s duty of care, voting requirements, and shareholder

110
Id. at 62, 61 n.2 (“Psuedo-foreign corporations are organized under the laws
of a state other than the forum state, but have essentially all of their contacts with the
forum state.”).
111
Id. at 61.
112
Id. at 61–62.
113
Id. at 62.
114
Id.
115
Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law Beyond State Borders:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1161 (2009).
116
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a) (West 2021) (“A foreign corporation…is
subject to the [governance] requirements [referenced in this section] if: (1) The
average of the property factor, the payroll factor, and the sales factor (as defined in
Sections 25129, 25132, and 25134 of the Revenue and Taxation Code) with respect to
it is more than 50 percent during its latest full income year and (2) more than one-half
of its outstanding voting securities are held of record by persons having addresses in
this state….”).
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inspection rights. 117 Other states, such as Louisiana and New Jersey,
purposely refused to codify the doctrine into law even though their
corporate law is shaped by the Model Business Corporation Act, which
includes the doctrine.118 This leaves the door open for the courts in those
states to disregard the doctrine.119 Also, states sometimes challenge the
doctrine in the case of shareholder inspection rights.120
Inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the records of a
corporation upon request.121 This right originally developed at English
common law in the 1700s to serve as a mechanism for shareholders to
protect their economic interest in corporations.122 Inspection rights were
not absolute, and for the request to be proper, the shareholder needed to
prove that the request was reasonable as to the time, place, and purpose.123
Today, all states have some form of inspection rights codified into statute;
however, a majority of jurisdictions hold that these statutes co-exist with
the common law and do not abrogate it.124 Some states, such as Missouri,
only grant inspection rights to resident shareholders of domestic
corporations.125 Others, such as California, grant inspection rights to
resident shareholders of either domestic or certain foreign corporations

117

Jacobs, supra note 115.
The Internal Affairs Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1480–81.
119
Id.
120
DeMott, supra note 39.
121
Robin Hui Huang & Randall S. Thomas, The Law and Practice of
Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis of China and the United
States, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 907, 909 (2020).
122
Browning Jeffries, Shareholder Access to Corporate Books and Records:
The Abrogation Debate, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1087, 1100 (2011).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1113–14 (2011); see, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. III Invs., Inc., 80
S.W.3d 855, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that Missouri’s statutory right of
inspection law did not abrogate the common law right of inspection because the statute
lacked a clear intent to do so).
125
See MO. REV. STAT. § 351.215(1) (2016) (“Each corporation shall keep
correct and complete books and records of accounts…. Each shareholder may at all
proper times have access to the books of the company, to examine the same, and under
such regulations as may be prescribed by the bylaws.”); see also MO. REV. STAT. §
351.215(6) (2016) (defining corporation as any organization created under Missouri
law and excluding foreign corporations).
118
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under Section 1601.126 Delaware codified its inspection law under Section
220 of the DGCL.127
Courts use several justifications for rejecting the Internal Affairs
Doctrine in the case of shareholder inspection rights.128 Some courts
simply regard a shareholder’s right to inspection as guaranteed by
common law and allow for the inspection of a foreign corporation’s
books.129 Other courts claim that a corporation impliedly accepts the
conditions of local law by doing business in the state or argue that a foreign
corporation does not have rights or privileges that are superior to domestic
corporations.130 Even the Chancery Court in Grove acknowledged that
there is substantial case law that holds that the Internal Affairs Doctrine
does not apply in cases of shareholder inspection rights.131 The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws notes in its comments that
“[t]he right of a shareholder to inspect the books of a corporation poses
special problems” and that the shareholder-inspection-rights law of a state
can be applied to a foreign corporation conducting substantial business in
the state.132 The Restatement reasons that determining inspection rights
differently in each state can be done practicably and “will not seriously
undermine the policy favoring uniform treatment for all shareholders of a
corporation.”133 The determination of whether shareholder inspection
rights are an internal affair and whether the Internal Affairs Doctrine
should be applied was a contested issue in Grove.134

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1601(a)(1) (West 2021) (“The accounting books,
records, and minutes of proceedings of the shareholders and the board and committees
of the board of any domestic corporation, and of any foreign corporation keeping any
records in this state or having its principal executive office in this state…physically
located within this state shall be open to inspection at the corporation's principal office
in this state, or if none, at the physical location for the corporation's registered agent
for service of process in this state, upon the written demand on the corporation of any
shareholder or holder of a voting trust certificate at any reasonable time during usual
business hours, for a purpose reasonably related to the holder's interests as a
shareholder or as the holder of a voting trust certificate”).
127
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (West 2021) (“Any stockholder, in
person or by attorney or other agent, shall, upon written demand under oath stating the
purpose thereof, have the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for any
proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from: (1) The corporation's stock
ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records; and (2) A subsidiary's
books and records….”).
128
DeMott, supra note 39.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904, 913 n.7 (Del. Ch. 2020).
132
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 cmt. d (1971).
133
Id.
134
238 A.3d at 913.
126
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, the Chancery Court of Delaware held
that, under the Internal Affairs Doctrine, the right of a shareholder to seek
inspection of the books and records of a Delaware corporation exists only
under Delaware law. 135 The court reached its decision by discussing the
rationales for the doctrine, the constitutional concerns, the history of the
doctrine with respect to shareholder inspection rights, and by comparing
the relevant corporate law of Delaware and California.136

A. Constitutional Concerns and The Rationales for the Doctrine
The Chancery Court began its analysis by stating the basic premise
of the Internal Affairs Doctrine and the rationale for it.137 The court quoted
Edgar and CTS Corp., concluding that a state’s authority to regulate a
corporation is well established.138 It continued, stating that the doctrine
holds that only one state should have the authority to govern a
corporation’s internal affairs to avoid conflicting demands on it. 139 Citing
other precedent by the United States Supreme Court, the Chancery Court
stated that corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit
their funds to corporate directors with the understanding that state law will
generally govern internal affairs.140
The court stated that an important policy served by the doctrine “is to
ensure the uniform treatment of directors, officers, and stockholders across
jurisdictions.”141 The court declared that a state has an interest in
promoting stable relationships among those involved in the corporation in
addition to ensuring that shareholders have an effective voice in the affairs
of the corporation.142 Citing a comment in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, the court articulated that this policy is achieved only
when a corporation is governed by a single state’s law.143 The court
135

Id. at 920. The Chancery Court also decided two other main issues: (1)
whether the plaintiff waived his inspection rights under California law by signing
several standard form agreements that included waiver language for inspection rights
under Delaware law and (2) whether the plaintiff could bring an action in a court
outside of Delaware when the certificate of incorporation included a forum selection
clause mandating a Delaware jurisdiction over internal affairs disputes. Id. at 907. The
court answered in the negative for both issues. Id.
136
Id. at 913–18.
137
Id. at 913–14.
138
Id. at 914.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 915.
142
Id. at 915–16.
143
Id. at 915.
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concluded that the Internal Affairs Doctrine prevents application of
inconsistent legal standards to corporations and provides certainty and
predictability–all of which protect the expectations of parties involved
with the corporation.144
The Chancery Court also briefly discussed the constitutional
concerns related to the Internal Affairs Doctrine.145 Specifically, it stated
that, among other constitutional underpinnings, the Commerce Clause
holds that a state has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation.146

B. The Doctrine and Shareholder Inspection Rights
The Chancery Court then turned to the issue of what matters are
covered by the doctrine.147 The court broadly stated that the doctrine
applies to matters pertaining to the relationship between the corporation
and its officers, directors, and shareholders and does not pertain to matters
where the rights of third parties outside the corporation are at issue.148 The
court specifically discussed the issue of shareholder inspection rights and
stated that they are “a core matter of internal corporate affairs.”149 The
court cited precedent of the Supreme Court of Delaware stating that a
shareholder’s ability to inspect books and records is an important piece of
the corporate governance landscape.150 It noted that the Supreme Court of
Delaware has, in interpreting Delaware’s shareholder inspection law,
struck a balance between the interests of shareholders in obtaining
information and the right of corporations to be free of unwarranted and
burdensome requests.151

C. Comparison of Delaware and California Corporate Law
Although the Chancery Court already concluded that inspection
rights are an internal affair, it continued its discussion by comparing the
inspection laws of Delaware and California.152 First, the court compared
Section 1601 of the California Corporations Code to Section 220 of the
DGCL.153 The court noted that, although the laws generally resemble each
144

Id.
Id. at 914.
146
Id. Other constitutional concerns raised by the Chancery Court included the
Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id.
147
Id. at 914–15.
148
Id. at 914.
149
Id. at 915.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 916.
153
Id.
145
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other, California grants shareholders broader rights to inspect a
corporation’s subsidiaries.154 Furthermore, the court declared, without
explanation, that the judicial interpretation of each statute could be
different.155
Then the court compared the other inspection-related laws of
California to those of Delaware.156 The court noted that California law
generally differs from Delaware law in that shareholders and directors
have certain absolute inspection rights under California law whereas those
rights are rebuttable by the corporation under Delaware law.157
Specifically, under California law, a shareholder has an absolute right to
obtain a shareholder list regardless of purpose, whereas under Delaware
law, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the shareholder has a
proper purpose.158 Similarly, under California law, directors have an
absolute right to request an inspection of the corporation's books, records,
and documents of every kind whereas, under Delaware law, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the director has a proper purpose.159 Under
Delaware law, the corporation can make a showing of an improper purpose
to defeat the shareholder’s or the director’s inspection request.160
The court concluded that, while the California inspection laws are not
radically different from Delaware’s, they are also not identical.161 It stated
that California’s balancing of interests between the corporation and its
shareholders differs from that of Delaware and that the inspection rights
granted under California law are applicable to both domestic and foreign
corporations.162 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that California is
not alone in granting inspection rights to shareholders for foreign
corporations.163 The court expressed concern for this fact in that, if other
states can define shareholder inspection rights, “then a Delaware
corporation could be subjected to different provisions and standards in
jurisdictions around the country.”164
Ultimately, the Chancery Court concluded that the United States
Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Delaware precedent dictated that
inspection rights are an internal affair.165 As a result, the Internal Affairs

154

Id.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 916–17.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 917.
160
Id. at 916–17.
161
Id. at 917.
162
Id. at 917–18.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 918.
165
Id.
155
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Doctrine prevented Grove from demanding inspection using the California
inspection laws.166

V. COMMENT
The impact of the decision in Grove is significant considering
Delaware’s prominence in the field of corporate law. More than half of
all publicly held corporations are incorporated there, as are over sixty
percent of Fortune 500 companies. 167 Of all fifty states, Delaware has the
greatest number of incorporated companies whose principal place of
business is located in in another state.168 The decision exemplifies
Delaware’s continued strong support of the Internal Affairs Doctrine and
the competing interests of the states in regulating corporations.
Nevertheless, the strong stance taken by the Chancery Court could have
implications beyond the issue of shareholder inspection rights.
Specifically, disputes could arise among states seeking to enforce their
own corporate laws because it is unclear whether a state is required by the
Constitution to apply the doctrine or if a state can disregard it. In addition,
newer state laws mandating diversity on boards of directors could run
afoul of the doctrine.

A. Delaware’s Strong Stance on the Internal Affairs Doctrine
In Grove, the Chancery Court took a strong stance in support of the
Internal Affairs Doctrine when it disregarded substantial contrary
authority in reaching its decision.169 In a footnote in the Grove opinion,
the Chancery Court engaged in a healthy discussion of existing authority
concerning inspection rights and application of the doctrine.170 It
acknowledged that a “substantial volume of authority” from numerous
jurisdictions holds that the Internal Affairs Doctrine does not preclude
enforcement of the inspection laws of a forum state upon a foreign
corporation.171 The court recognized conflicting precedent and cited
several secondary sources that summarized how the doctrine applies to
inspection rights.172 The court conceded that its decision does not parse
through the competing authorities. Rather, the court argued that a larger

166

Id.
Facts and Myths, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/facts-andmyths/ [https://perma.cc/AM6X-RZEQ] (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
168
Id.
169
238 A.3d at 913 n.7, 918.
170
Id. at 913 n.7.
171
Id.
172
Id.
167
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inquiry is needed.173 This inquiry would “require tracing the development
of the internal affairs doctrine from its origins as a limitation on the
authority of a non-chartering jurisdiction, to a discretionary abstention
doctrine, to its contemporary manifestation as a choice-of-law
principle.”174 Despite the lack of consistency among authorities and the
need for a larger inquiry, the court held that shareholder inspection rights
are a core matter of internal corporate affairs and that the doctrine dictates
that only the laws of the state of incorporation apply.175
The reason for Delaware’s strong stance in support of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine becomes clearer when two significant benefits it receives
are considered. First, Delaware assesses franchise taxes and filing fees
from companies incorporated within it.176 Due to the state’s relatively
small size, these taxes and fees can make up a large percentage of its
annual tax revenue – anywhere from sixteen to twenty-five percent.177
Second, Delaware, and the legal system it has crafted, maintains a certain
level of prestige and power by having a large number of corporations
registered there.178 Specifically, Delaware-based corporate attorneys and
the Delaware courts are influential in shaping the state’s corporate law.179
Delaware corporate attorneys are engaged as co-counsel by out-of-state
attorneys litigating in Delaware courts and the Supreme Court of Delaware
is sometimes regarded as the unofficial “highest court” of corporate law.180
Challenges to the Internal Affairs Doctrine and the imposition of state
specific corporate laws upon Delaware corporations reduce the need for
corporations to be incorporated in Delaware, potentially reducing both the
state’s tax base and prestige.181
Delaware’s strong stance is arguably understandable; however, it
may be slightly alarmist in reality. Allowing an exception to the doctrine
for inspection rights is not a new idea, as evidenced by the substantial

173

Id.
Id.
175
Id. at 913, 915.
176
Stevelman, supra note 5, at 67.
177
Id.
178
See generally id. (discussing Delaware’s monetary and nonmonetary stakes
in preserving its position in the corporate law realm).
179
Id. at 69, 71.
180
Id. at 69–71.
181
See id. at 60 (“Delaware's preeminence in corporate law is vitally connected
to the internal affairs doctrine (IAD). Under the IAD, incorporation effectuates a
choice of corporate law that is binding on the corporation and its directors, officers,
and controlling shareholders. Even if a Delaware-incorporated company, its managers,
or controlling shareholders become defendants in out-of-state corporate lawsuits,
Delaware's corporate statutes and fiduciary tenets will still govern. The IAD makes
choice of corporate law durable, which is relevant to decision making about
chartering, of course”).
174
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authority that runs contrary to the Grove opinion.182 The Chancery Court
noted that California is not alone in granting its residents the right to
inspect the books of foreign corporations, and it conceded that the
inspection laws of California and Delaware are not radically different. 183
The court acknowledged that the main difference between California’s
Section 1601 and Delaware’s Section 220 was that California provided
broader rights to shareholders for inspection of subsidiaries. 184 However,
the court expressed concern about these differences and in subjecting
Delaware corporations to different inspection standards around the
country.185 Is Delaware’s interest in regulating internal affairs so great that
it overrides the competing interests of California in regulating a
corporation with its principal headquarters in California? Delaware’s
interest should not outweigh the considerable contrary authority or
California’s substantial interest in regulating corporations which, for all
intents and purposes, principally reside within its borders. Such a
corporation should be aware of and be able to adhere to the inspection laws
of the state in which it resides. Conveniently, Delaware’s interest in
protecting its corporations also happens to protect the revenues and
prestige it receives by being the top forum choice for incorporating
companies.

B. Competing Interests of the States
The Chancery Court mentioned an incorporating state’s interest in
regulating a corporation.186 However, that is not the only interest at play.
The court quoted comment e of Section 302 of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws to support its argument, which states that the
“[u]niform treatment of directors, officers and shareholders is an important
objective which can only be attained by having the rights and liabilities of
those persons with respect to the corporation governed by a single law.”.187
In a footnote, the court also mentioned Section 304 of the Restatement
which states that the law of the incorporating state should generally
“determine the right of a shareholder to participate in the administration
of the affairs of the corporation.”188 Unmentioned by the court is comment
d of Section 304 which cuts against the court’s holding.189 It states that
“[t]he right of a shareholder to inspect the books of a corporation poses

182

Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904, 913 n.7 (Del. Ch. 2020).
Id. at 917–18.
184
Id. at 916.
185
Id. at 918.
186
Id. at 915.
187
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971)).
188
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 (1971)).
189
Id. at 915–16.
183
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special problems,” and inspection rights laws of the forum state can be
applied to foreign corporations conducting substantial business in the
state.190 The Restatement recognizes what the Chancery Court tries to
downplay, the existence of substantial contrary authority and the interest
California has in regulating its markets and protecting resident
shareholders.191
As the largest state in both population and economy, California has a
significant interest in regulating the internal affairs of “foreign”
corporations.192 The size of California’s economy rivals that of
independent nations.193 As a separate country, it would be the fifth largest
in the world, with a gross domestic product (“GDP”) of $3.1 trillion dollars
– fifteen percent of the economy of the United States.194 There are 1,210
publicly held companies principally based in California, but only 112 of
them are incorporated there.195 In 2020, fifty-three companies on the
Fortune 500 were principally based in California.196 Many of these
corporations, such as Google, Intel, and Walt Disney Co., are Delaware
corporations headquartered in California.197 California has a significant
interest in regulating these corporations that reside primarily in California
but are incorporated in Delaware – a state that by comparison has a GDP
of seventy-six billion dollars.198 In addition to California’s interest as a
state, a California resident shareholder probably expects to be able to
invoke California law in a California court against a corporation with
California headquarters. In his filing in opposition to Juul’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, Grove stated that he, as a California resident,

190

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 cmt. d (1971).
Id.
192
Brynn Epstein & Daphne Lofquist, U.S. Census Bureau Today Delivers
State Population Totals for Congressional Apportionment, UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU (April 26, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/04/2020census-data-release.html [https://perma.cc/G2NS-U8SH].
193
California, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/places/ca/?sh=34db69763fef
[https://perma.cc/6VFM-7KMV] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
194
Id.
195
Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101,
2112 (2018).
196
Fortune 500, supra note 3.
197
Alphabet
Inc.,
SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=1652044&owner=exclude
[https://perma.cc/A947-B9Z4] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); Intel Corp, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=50863&owner=exclude
[https://perma.cc/8HHR-FTT9] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); Walt Disney Co, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=1744489&owner=exclude
[https://perma.cc/9M8W-23PJ] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
198
Delaware, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/places/de/?sh=538f3d8a7599
[https://perma.cc/VB6L-EXF6] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
191

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/10

22

Meyer: Strengthening the Internal Affairs Doctrine Juul Labs, Inc. v. Gr

2021]

THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

1381

chose to “avail himself of his rights under California law” in a California
court.199

C. Implications Beyond Shareholder Inspection Rights
The decision in Grove concerned shareholder inspection rights. 200
However, Delaware’s strong support of the Internal Affairs Doctrine could
have far-reaching implications. Delaware’s stance could lead to more
conflict among the states over corporate governance and bleed over into
an emerging area of law mandating diversity on boards of directors.
Recently, California enacted new corporate governance laws
mandating diversity on the boards of directors for certain corporations
doing business in California.201 In 2018, California mandated gender
diversity.202 Section 301.3 requires that any domestic or foreign publicly
held corporation with a principal place of business in California needed to
have a minimum number of female directors by the 2021 calendar year.203
Then in 2020, California enacted section 301.4, requiring that any
publicly held domestic or foreign corporation whose principal executive
offices reside in California need to have a minimum number of directors
from underrepresented communities by the end of 2022.204 Commentators
See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment On the
Pleadings at 9–10, Juul Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904 (Del. Ch. 2020) (No. 20200005-JTL), 2020 WL 1076016, at 9–10.
200
See generally 238 A.3d 904.
201
David Bell et. al., New Law Requires Diversity on Boards of CaliforniaBased Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 10, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/10/new-law-requires-diversity-on-boardsof-california-based-companies/ [https://perma.cc/H2RC-SLGE].
202
Id.
203
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (West 2021) (“(a) No later than the close of the
2019 calendar year, a publicly held domestic or foreign corporation whose principal
executive offices, according to the corporation's SEC 10-K form, are located in
California shall have a minimum of one female director on its board….(b) No later
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with the following: (1) If its number of directors is six or more, the corporation shall
have a minimum of three female directors. (2) If its number of directors is five, the
corporation shall have a minimum of two female directors. (3) If its number of
directors is four or fewer, the corporation shall have a minimum of one female
director.”).
204
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.4 (West 2021) (“(a) No later than the close of the
2021 calendar year, a publicly held domestic or foreign corporation whose principal
executive offices, according to the corporation's SEC 10-K form, are located in
California shall have a minimum of one director from an underrepresented community
on its board….(b) No later than the close of the 2022 calendar year, a publicly held
domestic or foreign corporation whose principal executive offices…are located in
California shall comply with the following: (1) If its number of directors is nine or
199

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 10

1382

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

expect these statutes to be challenged on various constitutional and other
grounds.205 The Internal Affairs Doctrine is thought to be one of the
grounds on which plaintiffs will challenge the diversity statutes.206
No Delaware courts have addressed the diversity statutes. However,
it is likely that Delaware will invoke the Internal Affairs Doctrine and
refuse to enforce them, as it has with other corporate governance laws of
foreign states.207 For example, the Supreme Court of Delaware in a prior
case articulated that a shareholder’s right to vote falls squarely within the
doctrine when confronted with a California statute that attempted to
regulate aspects of the internal governance of a Delaware corporation
operating within California. 208 Delaware, in order to maintain its
dominance, certainly has an interest in preventing California and other
states from regulating board composition. Businesses based in California
would have less incentive to incorporate in Delaware if California law still
applied.209 Furthermore, California is not alone in attempting to regulate
board composition. New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Illinois are also
considering similar diversity legislation which may motivate Delaware to
assert the doctrine to counter this movement.210 However, there is
disagreement among scholars as to whether the diversity statutes are an
internal affair between shareholders and the corporation or an external
affair between the corporation and the public.211 Only time will tell.
Conflicts and disagreements over the Internal Affairs Doctrine are likely
to continue until the United States Supreme Court finally addresses the
bases for it.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Grove the Delaware Court of Chancery reaffirmed its adherence
to the Internal Affairs Doctrine in holding that only Delaware law will
govern shareholder inspection rights for a Delaware corporation.212 In
doing so it reaffirmed a broad interpretation of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine that serves that state’s own interests over the significant interests
of other states. The Chancery Court expressed concern about subjecting
its corporations to inconsistent obligations in other states and spoke of
fairness, predictability, and promoting commerce. However, the court
overlooked the significant monetary and personal stake Delaware has in
preserving the doctrine. Specifically, Delaware receives substantial
revenues from companies incorporating within the state and maintains a
high level of prestige in the development of corporate law. The Chancery
Court’s interpretation is based upon questionable legal bases that could tee
up further controversy in the future. Beyond shareholder inspection rights,
these controversies could impact other important areas in which states seek
to challenge the doctrine such as diversity statutes.
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